J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme Court Goes Down the Slippery Slope with Regard to Juvenile Interrogations

               When a juvenile is taken into custody, it is incumbent upon law enforcement to properly advise the juvenile of their Miranda rights prior to conducting any interrogation. N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-2101. Where the juvenile is under the age of 14, any statement made by the juvenile outside the presence of their parent, guardian, custodian or attorney is inadmissible. Id. However, the question that most frequently confronts North Carolina courts is that of whether a juvenile has actually been taken into custody.

                To undertake such an inquiry, the courts of this State have followed the objective test originally set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Under this test, a reviewing court determines “whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way." In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 583 (2007). Relevant considerations for an objective inquiry have included (1) the threatening presence of police officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching of the suspect; and (4) the choice of language used by the interrogator. Id. at 584. The Court of Appeals, in its 2007 decision in In re I.R.T. broadened the factors that could be considered to include a juvenile’s age. Id. This inclusion was not without its critics who claimed that the Court of Appeal’s inclusion of the juvenile’s age would introduce a subjective element into an otherwise objective analysis and in so doing, would foster uncertainty in police investigations by forcing an interrogating officer to guess whether a juvenile was “in custody”. See Jonathan S. Carter, You're Only as "Free to Leave" as You Feel: Police Encounters with Juveniles and the Trouble with Differential Standards for Investigatory Stops Under In re I.R.T., 88 N.C.L. Rev. 1389, 1389-1442 (2010). The N.C. Supreme Court weighing in on this issue in its decision in In re J.D.B, agreed with the critics and chose to not include a juvenile’s age as one of the factors in determining whether a juvenile had been taken into custody. In re J.D.B.,  363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009).

                Today the U.S. Supreme Court, taking up the N.C. Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B., reversed and remanded.  Indeed, a juvenile’s age is to be a relevant consideration in determining objectively whether a reasonable person would believe that a juvenile was free to leave an interrogation. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09–11121. (U.S. S. Ct. June 16, 2011).  Supporting the Court Majority’s position were a host of arguments including commonsense conclusions about child behavior that juveniles “. . .often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,” that they “. . .are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” than adults and finally that the law has historically reflected the same commonsense assumptions by its impositions of disability in contract and in other legal situations.  But as the critics stated earlier, as do Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas today, there will be a price to pay . Now that the door has been opened to injecting a subjective consideration into what was previously a fairly straight-forward, objective test, what is to stop further considerations from being injected? As Jonathan S. Carter suggests, what prevents race, gender or economic status from being considered? And from the standpoint of law enforcement, how are they going to know (without knowing much about the suspect) whether some subject factor within the juvenile’s make-up and circumstances will lead the juvenile to believe (as perceived by a “reasonable person”) that the juvenile is not free to leave an interrogation when in facts are to the contrary?  

The J.B.D. v. North Carolina opinion can be read at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11121.pdf