Contrary to widely held belief in the legal community, in North Carolina Chapter 50 custody actions, there is no such thing as "permanent custody." All determinations of custody are temporary in nature even if the intent of the court and the parties is to make them durable. All custody orders, whether fashioned through Chapter 50 or Chapter 7B, must be consistent with the best interests of the child. See Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440 (1982). What this practically means is that child custody determinations are about the child whose needs change, following the child's physical, emotional and intellectual development and ever changing requirements. Such determinations are not really at all about the wishes and desires of the litigants, though there is no doubt that equitable considerations play a role in furthering these. What is in the best interest of a child is, of course, subject to change. Thus, custody orders of whatever origin are always modifiable based upon the universal standard-that there has occurred a material change in circumstances. See In re Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971; Crosby.
Recognising that a material change in circumstances is required to modify an existing child custody determination, the obvious question is then what constitutes a "material change." The answer to this in large part is subjective and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, regardless of the a case's subjective factual variability, all material changes, if they are to affect custody, must have an established nexus with the welfare of the child. This may be immediately and profoundly manifest (i.e. the party vested by the court with primary custody is deceased) or it may be more subtle (i.e. the child has developed special needs that cannot be well provided for by the custodial party but may be provided for more effectively by the party with secondary custody). For the later, see Metz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 530 S.E.2d 79 (2000). Either way, the change or changes cumulatively must substantially and materially affect the welfare of the juvenile
and may not have been in play at the time the original custodial order was entered.
