Wednesday 22 January 2014

Voiding Relinquishments that are Older than Six Months Old

   A permanent plan should be permanent in a juvenile case. That is, unless it doesn't work. In those cases where a plan of adoption was settled upon by the reviewing court and a necessary relinquishment cannot be obtained, N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-909 permits the DSS to motion the matter back into court to have any previously obtained relinquishment rendered void. An order for such relief can only come after the agency gives at least 15 days advanced notice of its intent  to the previously relinquishing parent. Further, it must be the case that the agency is taking no steps to terminate the non-relinquishing parent and that the relinquishment is at least six months old. At the hearing, the relinquishing parent has the ability to be heard on the issues of whether the relinquishment should be voided and the parent's plan to provide for the juvenile should the relinquishment tendered by that parent be rendered void.
   North Carolina Statute 7B-909 appears, then, to be a way of recovering from a plan of TPR/Adoption which, in hindsight was ill conceived or was compromised by post plan change circumstances, such as adverse behavior by the juvenile which has disrupted placements, the discovery of adverse and severe medical conditions affecting the child which complicate adoption, the inability to place a child due to age and a lack of adoptive parents, or other such circumstances.
   With the good, of course, there is always the bad and it should be noted that the statute does not provide an absolute win-win situation. For instance, a relinquishment from a parent that is rendered void makes more acute the possibility that the county voiding the relinquishment will seek child support from the parent. This is particularly troubling to a parent whose entire reason for relinquishing was based upon an agreement with social services that, in exchange for a relinquishment, stated that child support would be ceased and only the accumulated arrearages collected.
    From the agency's standpoint, the situation is even more concerning. The original plan of adoption could only have arisen as a result of the court finding that the parent was not able to provide for the needs and care of the minor child, either at the time of the hearing or in the near future. Perhaps enough time will have elapsed and the relinquishing parent now has a greater sense of purpose and wherewithal to accomplish those things that need to be done for the child. As pleasing a scenario as this might be, it must definitely be considered to be an unlikely one. Placing a child back in the home of a parent who has for at least a year allowed a child to languish is not without probable downfalls. It all likelihood, it will spell further trouble for the child forced into this situation, which will in turn lead to a report and no doubt, further DSS involvement.
   The moral of the story, to the extent that there is one, is to make sure the permanent plan in any case considers both the best and worst possible situations and that it has a way to deal with both. In the event that the situation is far worse than could have been imagined and resort must be made the General Statute 7B-909,  care must be taken from the standpoint of both the relinquishing parent and the agency to avoid entry back into the malaise that previously characterised the case, the very conditions, that started the parties talking about relinquishment in the first place.